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REPORTS OF CASES
DETERM.INED IN

THE SUPREME COURT
OJ' TBB

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

(Orim. No. 4864. In Bank.

Nov. 1, 1948.)

THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. REBEL B. CORNETT,
Appellant.
[1] Romicide-Instruct1on8-Self-defense.-An instruction in •
murder case that, to justify a killing in self-defense, it mU!lt
appear that the killing WIUI "absolutely necesbary" should not
be used, even if the quoted words are preceded by th., qU'llllieation that it must appear to defend:tnt's comprehension, as a
reasonable man, thnt the killing was neCCf:lSllrr to l!void d1l.n~r,
since such instruction miJ;ht iudicate to the jury that the right
to self-defense is avaibble only where the J:ilIing- is !\hsolutell
necessary to sllve life.
[I] Oriminal Law - Instructions - Cautionary - Admissions.Where the prosecution in a murder case rdics on evid"nce of
iefendant's oral admissions, an instruction to view SUI'.h ndmissions with CAution should be given in view of Ccxlo CiT.
Pree., § 2061(4).
[3] Romicide-Instructions-Murder-Intent.-In a murder CIlP',
it is error to give an instruction that there Deed be no appneiable space of time betvrecn the intent to kill an.l the nv..,rt
act, that a man may do a thing deliber~tely from Il moment's
reflection as well as after pondering over the subjcd for a
month or a year, and that he can premeditate the moment h..

[1] See 13 CaI.Jur. 632; 26 Am.Jur. 537.
[2] See 8 Cal.Jur. 305; 53 Am.Jur. 481.
licK. Dig. Referenccs: [1] Homicide, § 208; [2] Criminl1l Law,
1691; [3] Homicide, §185; [4,8] Homicide, §268; [5,7] ilOD&icide, 229(1); [6] Homicide, 1 H3.
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conr.eives the purpose, since the instruction rliminat..s tho
necessity for deliberation or pr~m(\ditation in forming tho
intent and hence substantially deletes the difference between
first and second degree murder.
Id.-Appe:J.I-Harmless an.l Reversible Error-Instructlons.In a homicide case, an instruction which properly states thllt
the Inw does not undertake to measure the length of the period
during which a thought must be pondered before it can ripen
into an intent to kill which is deliberate and premeditated,
and that the true test is nut the dura~ion of time but the extent
of the reflection, did not otH'rate to cure the error in a preceding instruction that a man may do a thing deliberately and
intentionally froc a moment's reflection, where the evidence
was conJicting as to whether the murder was of the first or
second degree, and where the jury might have been misled by
the erroneous instruction.
Id.-Instructions-Burden of Proof-Mitigation.-In a murder case, it is error to give an instruction in the lunguage of
Pen. Code, § 1105, relating to burden of proof of circumstances
in mitigation, since the code section does not set forth a rule
relating to the burden of proof, but merely declares a rule of
procedure that imposes on the defendant only a duty of going
forward with the evidence of mitigating circumstances.
Id.-Burden of Proof-Mitigation.-A defendant charJ'l!d with
murder is not required to prove mitigating circumst:mcell by a
prepondl!rance of the evidence, but need only introduce evidence of such circumstances to raise a reasonable doubt of his
guilt.
Id.-Instructions-Burden of Proof-Mitigation.-In a homicide cllse, an instruction in the language of Pen. Code, § 1105,
is erroneous where the jury is not fully advised that such an
instruction has no applicll.tion in determining the degree of
murder, Rnd that it is applicable only in determining whether
the homicide constitutes murder or manslaughter, or is justifiI
able or excu,;able.
Id.-AplK'al-Harmless and Reversible Error-Instructions.In a murder ease, an erroneous instruction in the languag'e of
Pen. Code, § 1105, was not cured by instructions rclnting to
the presumption of innocence and the burden of the prosecution to prove every element of the crime beyond a reason:tble
doubt, where these instructions were not given in connection
with those relating to the mitigating circumst:lDces and hence
did not clarify the confusion likely to result from the reading
of the code section, and where, moreover, defendant admitted
the killing and claimed that the shooting was done in selfdcfenHe, since in such case he was required by the erroneous
instruction to produce more evidence than the law demands to
establish this defense.
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APPEAL (automatically taken unl.kr Pen. Code, § 12:39)
from a .iuuglllCnt of the Superior Court of Tulare County and
from an order denying a new trial. Frederick E. Stone, Judge.
Reversed.
Prosecntion for murder. Judgment of conviction imposing
the death pen'aIty, reversed.
Edward M. Raskin, under appointment by the Supreme
Court, for Appellant.
Fred N. Howser, Attorney General, and Frank RiehardR,
Deputy Attorney General, for Respondent.
TR.A YNOR, J.-Defendant was charged with the murder
of Fred Weaver Cole, the stepfather of his divorced wife. A
jury found him guilty of murder in the first degr('e nnd m:!dc
no recommendation as to penalty. The trial court denied his
motion for a new trial and seLtcnced him to death. This is
an automatic appe:u from the judgment imposing the death
penalty. (Pen. Code, § 1239 (b).)
The circumstances of the homicide, according to the testimony of the witnesses for the prosecution, were: At the time
of the homicide defendant, a pipe yard worker, \vas living
with his divorced wife, Pauline Cornett, and their eight
children in a one-room cabin in a labor camp at Woodlake,
California. On September 28, 1947, defendant was seeking
employment for his children in the cotton fields and had
returned to the cabin at 3 o'clock in the afternoon. Mrs. Cornett was then preparing dinner; several of the children were
in the cabin, while the others were outside. After defenoant
entered the cabin an argument immediately took pbee between him and Mrs. Cornett. She accused him of drinking,
and he cursed her repeatedly; he repeated that hf' was "going
to get" her and the "entire bunch" including t hc decedent.
Shortly after, she left the room to avoid him and went into the
lavatory. Finally she went out of the house and concealed herself behind buildings near by so thlat he would not be able to
find her. Meanwhile, defendant secured a Japanese Luger from
his bed and placed it under his shirt; after utteriug' words
to the effect that he was going to get drunk, he left the cabin
" and drove away in his automobile. Thereafter a neighbor took
Mrs. Cornett and seven of her children to the home of the
decedent in Exeter. Upon their arrival Mrs. Cornett related to
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the decedent what had occurred at the cabin at Woodlake,
whereupon the decedent secured two pistols and placed them
under his shirt. She and the children went into the house,
while he waited on the front porch. A short time later defendant arrived in his automobile. By this time all the children
except Virginia, aged 15, had gone upstairs: Virginia and
Mrs. Cornett remained in the front room in order to observe
through the window the two men outside. After talking to tbl!
dc('euent for a few moments, defendant approached thc front
door and said, .. Come on out, Mom, you are in trouble." lirH.
Cornett then rushed out of the front room and departed
from the house througb the rear door. She entered the house·
:>f a neighbor, where she remained until ~he heard a shot
coming from the upstairs room of the decedent's honse. As
hoth defendant and decedent entert.-d the house, Virginia
ran upstairs.
Defendant proceeded up the stairs, and the decedent followed several steps behind. Neither defendant nor the decedont held a gun in his hands as he ascended. At this time
Virginia was sitting on the window sill behind a dresser,
which was located near the head of the stairs; Letta, aged 13,
was standing at the head of the stairway, whil£' Jamt'S, a~l'd
10, was behind a sewing machine; the younger children were
~Ilaying on the floor. When the men arrived at the head of
the stairs defendant said to the decedent, "You better drllw,
this is your last draw." As they entered the room defendant
a..~ked him if he )mew where Mrs. Cornett had gone, and he
replied that he didn't know. Thereupon defendant looked
behind a dressing screen, apparently seeking Mrs. Cornett,
and then removing his gun from his shirt, whirled around
and shot the decedent, who at that time was standing sideways
to "him about lI.ve" feet "away. The decedent caught bimself on
a chair. Defendant then said, "II am going to Visalia anil give
llP" ; the decedent said, "I will go with you." Defendant
replied, "No, you are not," and approaching the deCt.'Cient
very closely tired a second shot into his stomach. This time
the decedent fell to the floor. After removing the decedent's
two guns from his shirt, defendant went downstairs and placed
one of the decedent's guns in the front room. Taking the otber
two guns with him, he drove away in bis automobile.
Defendant was apprehended a short time later in Woodlake
by Chief of Police Borgman and Police Officer Bolen of
Exeter, who testified as follows: After Cbief Borgulan hkd
called at the residence of the decedent to inVel>ti!;:lh; the
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shooting, he and Officer Bolen immediately proceeded to Woodlake, where they \vere joined by the chief of police of Woodlake. They proceeded to defendant's cabin but found no
one there. As they were about to leave, however, they saw
defendant's car approaching and awaited his arrival. AI defondant stepped out of his ear, the three officers pointed their
gUllS at him and ordered him repeatedly to drop his gun.
Def('ndant at first ignored their orders, but finally dropped
the gun on the third command. The officers immediately
searched him and fouud the Luger under his shirt. As they
were taking defendant to Visalia he asked, •'How is he Y, ,
Chief Borman replied, "He was still alive when we left town,.
but he has probably passed away now." Defendant then said,
"Good, I have been wanting to do this for a long time. "
The circumstances of the killing according to the testimony of defendant were: On the morning of September 28,
after placing his Luger in his shirt, he left the cabin at
11 :20 to seek employment for his children. After he had
returned in the afternoon, Mrs. Cornett began to accuse
him of drinking, but he told her that he had not been drinking.
He was not angry; he warned her, however, t.hat if she continued to accuse him he would,..go to town to obtain a drink.
He departed shortly thereafter and drove up and down the
main street of Woodlake. He returned about 15 minutes
later and learned that a neighbor had taken Mrs. Cornett and
the children to the home of the decedent. He thereupon went
to the home of the decedent and found him waiting on the
front porch. The decedent greeted him and asked him if he
wanted to come into the house. The defendant repJied t.hat
his purpose in coming was merely to get the children, and
that he wanted to hurry back to Woodlake, since it was
getting late in the evening. As he appr6ached the door the
decedent said, "Wait.," and looking back defendant saw that
the decedent had drawn a gun and was pointing it at him.
Defendant remonstrated with him and told him to put the gun
away. Then he dashed back toward him and said, "Don't do
that, Fred." The decedent thrust his left arm forth, and defendant seized it. The decedent said," I am going to kill you,"
but defendant argued with him as he held his left arm and kept
down the other hand in which the decedent held his gun.
At this stage of his testimony defendant testified: "When
1 kept on arguing with him to put the gun down-I s,'lid, 'Get
~t off mI'. You don 'f want to kill me. J didn 'f. come here for
iwy u(luble.' He said, 'Well, you've got a gun.' 1 said, •That '.
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: PVi> got. n /:!l1n. hilt r'w~ r-otit h"ttnnp.<lllp, not ('Illt 1i!~1'
ITl' I::lid, • W('lI, go 011 in,' and raised the gun back
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on me. And I walked sideways, but I didn't get out of his
reach through the door. Then we had another argument.
I kept asking him to take it off and he kept telling me five
or six times he was going to kill me."
They finally entered the front room and proceeded up·
stairs with defendant leading the way. As the decedent
followed, he held his gun in his hand but did not point it
directly at defendant. Both meu continued to swear and
argue. Letla was near the head of the stair\vay looking down
at them as they ascended. When they neared the head of
the stairs, Letta ran down, Rtatin~ that she wonld call the
police; the decedent replied that he would take c:!rc of his
own job, and that he didn't require any policcmen. .After
they had entered the uJlstairs room, the decedcut rai!:cJ hi"
gUll toward the hips of defenuuJ1t. anll st.ated, "You better
make your draw. 'I'his is your last chance. "
Defendant testified that at that partieulnr tiIPA QIlly he, the
decedent, and two Ilmall childrell, aged 3. :md ~, werc.
in the room; and that the' two children were playing on the
floor. His testimony continues: "I stepped about three steps
to the foot of that bed and 1: looked baek and he was coming
....on me with his gun like that. . . . A.'l he come that way on
mc I turned my head on tile right. I wheeled right quick
and made my draw and as I run into him I struck at him
and hit his right arm and that kept him sideways and hig gun
fell out of his hand on the floor. Aud the kids wsa in bctw,-en
us and I jumped back and snapped a shot and fired again lUI
he went do\VD." The shots "weren't over a second. They
just follo\ved one another."
After t.he decedent fell defendant placed his foot agtlinst
his shoulder and pushed him over in order to 900 his face and
said, "Fred, you made me s1100t you." Tht) docedent didn't
answer. He picked up the decedent's gun so that the sYnall
children would not hann themselve::; :md went dOWDstnir:..
Taking the two guns with him he left the house and wcut to
Woodlake.
Defendant denied that he had made a statcmcllt at hill
cabin either to Mrs. Cornett or to his children about shootin(;
the decedent. He further denied that he had stated to the
decedent to make his last draw. but testified that the decedent
himself had made such II l'ItatpnH. "t to him. Hl' 91l'10 t('~tifh!d
that when he was approached by the offiCCl'8 at Woodlakt: he
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dropped his gun immediately upon the first command; he
denied that he had made an admission to the police officers that
he had been wanting to kill the decedent for a long time.
[1] Defendant contends that the trial court committed
error in giving the following instruction on self-defense by
including therein the words" absolutely necessary"; "The
court instl."uets the jury that the mere apprehension of danber
is insufficient to justify an as..<;ault with a deadly weapon.
The fear if any must have been produced by circumstances
such as would be sufficient to excite the fears of a reasonable
person. The law of self-defense is founded on necessity, and
ia order to justify the taking of life upon this ground it must
not only appear to the person using the deadly weapon, as a
rensonable man, that he had reason to believe, and "did believe,
that he was in danger of his life, or of receiving great bodily
harm, but it must also appear to his comprehension, as a reaRonable man, that to avoid such danger, it was absolutely
necessary for him to use the deadly weapon on the other
party. . . . The court further instructs the jury that to
justify the assault wi-!ha deadly weapon of another in selfdeiense, it must appear to the person using the deadly weapon,
as a reasonable person, that the danger, if any, was so urgent
and pressing that in order to save his own life or to prevent
his receiving great bodily harm, the assault with the deadly
weapon of the other was absolu,tely necessary. . . ." [Italics
added.] The use of the term "absolutely necessary" in such
iuc;tructions has been condemned, since it might have the effect
of misleading jurors to believe that the right of self·defense
can be asserted only if the act of killing was actually necessary. (People v. Carmichael, 198 Cal. 534, 549 [246 P. 621.)
Preceding the word "absolutely," however, the instruction
indicates that "itmust~._.~ppea:r to. his comprehension,
-as a reasonable man,· that to avoid danger" it was necessary
for the defendant to take the life of another. Although the
instruction when considered in its entirety shows that the
taldng of life depends upon reasonable appearance to the
defendant (People v. Holt, 25 Ca1.2d 59, 64 [153 P.2d 21] ;
People v. Acosta, 21 Cal.App.2d 57, 61 [68 P.2d 298]), such
an instruction should not be used because it might indicate
to the jury that the right to self-defense is available only
where the killing is absolutely necessary to save life.
[2] The trial court erred in failing to give an instruction
that the jury should have viewed with caution the oral admis.
siona of defendant. Section 2061 (4) of the Code of Civil
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. Procedure provides that a jury is "to be instructed on all
proper occasions i that the testimony of an accomplice ought
to be viewed with distrust, and the evidence of the oral admissions of a party with eaution." It is clear that in view
of the foregoing code section the trial cOurt should have
given such a cautionary instruction. (People v. Koenig, 29
Ca1.2d 87, 94 [173 P.2d 1] ; see People v. Thomas. 25 Ca1.2d
880.891 [156 P.2d 7].)
[3] The trial court also erred in giving the following instrnction: "There must be an intent to kill, but there need
be, however, no appreciable space of time between the forming
of the intent to kill and the overt act-they may be as instantaneous as successive thoughts of the mind. A man may do
a thing wilfully, deliberately and intentionally from a moment's reflection as well as after pondering over the subject
for a month or a year. He' can premeditate, that is, think
before doing the act, the moment he conceives the purpose,
8S well as if the act was the result of long preeoncert or
preparation." As held in People v. Bender, 27 Ca1.2d 164,
182 [163P.2d 8}, and People v. Valentine. 28 Cal.2d 121.
134 [169 P.2d 1], such a combination of instructions is wholly
erroneous. CC Of course the instruction that there need be 'no
appreciable space of time between the intention to kill and
the act of killing . . .' is abstractly a correct statement of
the law. It will be properly understood (at least upon delibf.ration) by thol"le learned in the law as referring only to the
interval between the fully formulated intent and its execution, and a$ necessarily presupposing that trlte deliberation
a.nd premeditation characterized the procell 01. and preceded
tllUmate, IOf'mttlation 01 such intent •. _ But holding that
Imch declaration is a correct statement of the abstract principle of law is not a holding that the !lame declaration made .
to 8 jury without explanation is not error. Particularly is it
mi!:;leading when read in the oontext in which it was used. It
f'xcludes from the required showing any deliberation and
premeditation between the intent and the act of killing and
~ince. other portions of the instructions eliminate any necessity for deliberation or premeditation in forming the -intent
(' He can premeditate ... the moment he eonceiveR the
purpose . . .,' etc.), we find that the court has whol1y delE.-ted the only difference, in this type of case, between first
and s('cond degree murder." (People v. Bender, supra, 27
Ca1.2d 164, 182-183.) To say that the defl'ndant "I~an premeditate ••• the moment he conceives the purpose" pre-
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,-JudE'S the meaning of clm'flll thought and the wt'ighing of
consioerations ('mbodicrl i," I he orrlinary dictionary meaning
of "del ihcration" and "iircl11etiil at ion." (People v. Thomas,
supra, 25 Ca1.2d 880, 898; People v. Bender, 27 Ca1.2d 164,
183 [163 P.2d 8].)
[4] The trial court, however, gave other instructions relating to the meaning of .. deliberation and premeditation"
essential for murder in the first degree: .. The law does not
und.ertake to measure in units of time the length of the
period during which the thought must be pondered before it
can ripen into an intent to kill which is truly deliberate and
premeditated. The time will vary with different individuals
and under varying circumstances. The true test is not the
duration of time, but rather the extent of the reflection. A
cold, calculated judgment and decision may be arrived at in
a short period of time, but a mere unconsidered and rash impulse, ewn though it includes an intent to kill, is not su('h
delibcratick and premeditation 8S will fix an unlawful killing
as JUurder of the first rlegree. To constitute a ddibt·ratt· aud
prl~meditated killing, thc )!luyer mnst weigh Bnd eon~ider the
qUt'stion of killing and thp. reasons for :mrl azainst such a
choice and, having in mind the eon!:leqnences, d.~cidc to :md
cOJllmit the unlawful act cansing death." Al thon~:h thl' foregoing instruction states the proper meaning of tbl~ <ldibcrat!Oll
Ilnd premeditation required to f·stablish the offense of murder
in the first degree, it did not cure the error, bl:t ifJstca<l crl':)tcd
a, serious conflict in the in."lt.ructions. Wh,_ rl' it is impos!'Jihle
to determine which of inconsistent instructionr, Wt'rt', followed
by the jury, eonfiicting im;trllctions have bf~t'n h.-ld to constitute reve1'llible errol':. -{People v. Dail, 22 C·tJ.2d 6";2, 6:;3
{140 P.2d 828] ; Well.r v. Lloyd, 21 \Ca1.2d :152. ·lliS [1:12 P.2d
4}'1].) It cannot rellsonably be said that thl' jury, even tllOn~h
given tile proper instruction, was not misled by the further instruction that "a man lllay do a thing . . . ddiber~tdy nnd
intentionally from il motlJent's reflection. . .. He e:m premeditate, that is, think before doing the al!t, the mOmt'llt he
conceives tilt' purpose. . . . " The jury could find drf"lIIbnt
guilty of murd{'r in the tirst dep.ree only by findin,,~ that th,~
m'nrdt'r was the rpslllt of deliberation and prcm"di~:tf i'Jll.
since thl! killing did not take place during ihe (~omlllj~~ioll of
thl' reloni,~ enumerated in It(!ction 189 of thc Penal Code.
TJII, cyiul'ncc i.. without col1flil~t that defendant fired at tho
dC<!t!fknt aftt'r whirling around from a pt;sition in which
ho.: WWi I(loking behind a bed or screen. The jury could have
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f'ollnrl rll'f'l'nrhlnt guilty of' Jnlll"IIl'r in thl' fll"l'It dl'grf!C on thr·
ha!'lill IIf I,jtl"'r of the following finoillgs: (I) 14'olJowjlll~ UlP

)

)

correct instruction it may have found that thc defendant had
formed an intent to kill after carefully weighing and considering the question of killing, or that tire killing may have even
been deliberated before his arrival at the home of the decc(knt;
(2) it may have found that defendant Plltered the upstairs
room without previously considering the question of shooting
the decedent but that he conceived the thought "upon a
momClnt's reflection" as he whirled around. In view of the
e'ridence it is impossible to determine, thl'rdpre, wheth('r or
not the jury reached its verdict on the basis of the correct instructions. Clearly the evidence under proper instructions
would have supported a veruid of murder in the first degree;
it is also clear, however, that it is rl~:tsonably probable that
the jury, if it wa~ properly and unambiguously instructed,
could find dcfend:mt guilty of murder of lesser degrtle, since
it could have concluded that he shot the decedent as the result
of a sudden impulse engendE'red by an argument that had
taken place between thc two men, or by defendant's fear of
his own life caused by the tense rdationship betwecn them
at that time.
[0] The trial court committed an even more serious error
by instructing the jury in the language of Penal Codt' section
1105 that "Upon a trial for murder, the commission of the
homicide by the defendant being proved, the burden of proving circumstances of mitigation or that jm~tify or excuse it,
devolves upon the defendant, unless the proof on the part of
the prosecution tends to show that the crime committed only
amounts to manslaughter or that the defendant was justifiablt'
or excusable." (People v. Tkomiu, supra, 25 Cal.2d 880, 895.)
This section does not set forth a rule relating to the burden of
proof, but merely declares a rule of procedure that imposes
on the defendant only a duty of going forward with the evidence of mitigating circumstances. (Sec 9 So.Cal.L.Rev., 405,
409.) It was held in several early cases that the defendant
under this section has the burden of proving mitigating circumstances by a preponderance of the evidence. (People v.
Hong Ak Duck, 6i Ca1. 387, 396; People v. Rate1l, 63 Cal.
421, 422; People v. Arnold, 15 Cal. 476.) [6] It is now
established, however, that thc defendant is not required to
prove mitigating circumstances by a preponderance of the
evidence, but need only introduce evidence of such circumstances to raise a reasonable doubt of his guilt. (People v.
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Bushton, 80 Cal. 160, 164 [22 P. 127, 549] ; People v. Elliott.
80 Cal. 296, 305 [22 P. 207] ; People v. Post, 208 Cal. 433, 438
[281 P. 618] ; People v. Wells, 10 Ca1.2d 610, 622 [76 P.2d
493].) "The reading of section 1105 to the jurors without
explaining to them thc extent of the burden cast upon defendant \vould tend to creat<.> in their lllinds the impression that
the obligation cast upon dcft'ndant was much greater than
th<.> obligation cast upon him as defined by tbe late decisions
of the Supreme Court. Since an erroneous view of section
1105 was taken by the justices in the Hong Ah Duck and
other cases it cannot be successfully argucd that thc jurors.
wit.hout t.he aid of an cxplanatory instruction, could differen·
tiate bctween the view expressed in the early California cast's
and the view exprcssed in thp later cases and accurately de·
termine the extent of the obligation ca.c;t upon dercnrlant."
(People v. Carson, 43 Cal.App.2d 40, 44-45 [110 P.2d 98].)
Thus, a jury may construe "the burden of proving circum·
s~ces of mitigation" as imposing upon the defendant the
burden of persuasion on this particular issue, and may believe
that mitigating circumstances do not exist unless the defend·
ant proves the existence of such circumstances by a preponder.
anee of the evidence or by some othcr del,,'1'ee of proof.
[7] Moreover, the instruction is erroneous in that the
jury was not fully advised that such an instruction bas no
application in determining the degree of murder, and that
it is applicable only in determinillg whether the homicide con·
stitutes murder or manslaughter, or is justifiable or excusable.
(People v. Thomas, supra, 25 Cal.2d 880, 897; People v.
Valentine, supra, 28 Ca1.2d 121, 133.) The expression "circumstanccs of mitigatlOn" is capaqle of an interpretation by
a jury to include any circumstance that tends to reduce thc
crime from murder in the first degree. Such an instruction
therefore, while having no application in the determination
of the degrees of luurder, may have the effect of indi<.>ating
to the jury that a burden is imposed upon the defendant (if
the evidence shows murder in the firgt degree) of showing
mitigating circumstances to prove murder in the second de·
greer It may have the effect of foreclosing any consideration
by the jury that mitigating cirCulllstnnces, although not suffi·
cient in law to justify or exCUse the homicide, may be enough
to reduce the crime to second degree murder by counteracting
the element of premeditation or deliberation. Thus, a con·
, seientious jury, misled by the instruction, lIlny bdievt: that if
: the defendant does not satisfy the buruen of pergua:;ion relat-
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ing to mitigating circnmstances, it no longer has to conRider
such circumstances in its deliberations. Furthermore, "logic
Huggests that since such section in reality merely declares a
rule of procedure and does 110t relieve the state of the burden
of proving each and every essential element 'of guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt the propriety of reading it to the jury,
even with a proper explanation, is doubtful." (People v.
Thomas, supra, 25 Cal.2d 880, 896.)
[8] It may be contended that this instruction, though
erroneous, could not have prejudiced defendant. Such an
instruction may not be prejudici31, if the jury is adequately
instructed in connection with instructions relating to mitigating circumstances, that the prosecution has the burden
throughout the entire trial to prove every element of the
crime beyond a reasonable douht,. and that the burdpu of
persnasion never shifts to the defendant. (See People v.
Leddy, 95 Cal.App. 659, 672 [273 P. 110] ; People v. Richards,
1 Cal.App. 566, 572 [82 P. 691] ; People v. Hawes, 98 Cal.
648,653 [33 P. 791].) Although the trial court gave the usual
instructions relating to the presumptions of innocence and
the burden of the prosecution to prove every element of thc
crime beyond a reasonable doubt, such instructions did not
render the erroneous instruction harmless. Since thC!Se instructions were not given in connection with the instructions
relating to the lnitigating circumstances, they did not clarify
the confusion likely to result from the reading of section
1105. The jury might have concluded that an instruction
based on the language of section 1105, which was given in conjunction with the general instructions on self-defense, created
an exception to the rule that to be entitled to an acquittal
the defendant must only create a reasonable doubt in the
minds of the jurors. (People v. MarshalZ, 112 Cal. 422, 425426 [44P. 718].)
I
Since defendant admitted the killing and claimed that the
shooting was done in self-defense, the giving of the erroneous
instruction appears particularly prejudicial. (People v. Roe,
189 Cal. 548, 565 [209 P. 560]; People v. Marshall, supra,
112 Cal. 422, 425; People v. Post, Sttpra, 208 Cal. 433, 4384:19.) Defendant was entitled to have the jury in resolving
the conflict in the evidence apply to his testimony the rule as
to reasonable doubt. 'fhe jury following an erroneous view
of defendant's burden may have believed that after the prosecution had completed its case the burden shifted upon defendant to prove that the homicide was excusable. Accordingly,
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it may ha"e conehldl'd that dl!felldnnt by his tf'stlmony fnih'li
to sustain the burden of penmnsion on t.his issue. That tPsli·
mon('y, however, even though 1I0t enough in the minds of tilt>
jurors to prove seU-defense, might have been sufficient to
raise a reasonable doubt in their minds. Since defendant was
required by the erroneous instruction to produce more evidence than the law demands to establish his defense, he was in
effect deprived of the force of his testimony. Tbus, it canllot
reasonably be said that it is improbable that the jury would
bave reached a different res~t had they been properly instructed that defendant was required only to raise a reasonable doubt on the issue of self-defense. Such all instruction
therefore may have mislpd the jury on a matter vital to the
defense of defendant. (See People v. Silver, 16 Cal.2d 714,
723 [108 P.2d 41; People v. Dail, supra, 22 Cal.2d 642, 659.)
After a consideration of the entire record it is clear that the
giving of tbil; erron<'ous instruction, particularly when conJliderec1 wit.h tbe other erroneous instructions, has resulted in
a ruiscarrin~e of justice.
I
'
"""
-'."'.'
The jud~!Ilcnt and' the order denying the motion for new
trial arlO reversl~(l.
Gibson, C. J., Carter, J., Schauer, J., and Spence,
curred.
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